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Torts
BY JEFFREY MOBLEY*
INTRODUCTION

This Survey will analyze the recent Kentucky Supreme Court
decision of McCall v. Courier-Journal& Louisville Times Co.,'
in which the Court adopted a negligence standard of liability for
libel actions by private individuals against the media. 2 The Court
also recognized a new cause of action in Kentucky-false light invasion of privacy. 3
The case was an action for libel and invasion of privacy
brought by John McCall, a Louisville. attorney, following the
publication of an article in The Louisville Times on March 17,
1976.1 The article 5 reported the results of an-investigation by two
Times reporters, Richard Krantz and Tom Van Howe, into allegations that McCall had offered to "fix" a criminal case for
$10,000. In reversing the court of appeals' affirmance of summary judgment for the Times, 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that: (1) the article was defamatory as a matter of law; 7 (2)
the "neutral reportage" privilege is not recognized in Kentucky;8
(3) simple negligence is the post-Gertz standard of care to which

*Associate in the firm of Gullett, Sanford & Robinson, Nashville, Tennessee. J.D. 1982,
University of Kentucky. The author would like to express his appreciation to Richard C.
Ausness, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. Appreciation is also extended to Sheryl G. Snyder,
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, Kentucky, and to Edward M. Post, Taustine, Post,
Berman, Fineman & Kohn, Louisville, Kentucky.
S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981) (per curiam).
1623
2

Id. at 886.
3 Id. at 889.
4 Id. at 884.
5 The Louisville Times, Mar. 17, 1976, at Al, col. 5 (Home-Early Edition). The article also appeared in other editions of the Times.

6 623 S.W.2d at 884.
7 Id. at 885. See notes 19-23 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's holding on this point.

81d. at 887. See notes 44-49 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's cursory treatment of the privilege defense.
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a newspaper will be held in libel actions brought by private citizens; 9 and (4) the invasion of privacy tort of false light, as formulated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is actionable in Kentucky. 10
The article giving rise to the McCall case was a Louisville
Times investigative report" detailing McCall's dealings with
Kristie Frazier, a defendant charged with drug trafficking in Jefferson Circuit Court. While conducting an investigation of "al2
leged harassment of the [Jefferson County's] drug community,"'
reporters Krantz and Van Howe interviewed Frazier. Frazier
told the reporters that she had contacted McCall concerning
legal representation in her criminal case and that McCall had offered to represent her, guaranteeing her that tor $10,000 she
would "'walk in the courtroom and turn around and walk back
out." '" 3 Frazier and a witness to Frazier's conversation with

McCall both signed affidavits in support of their allegations that
McCall's $10,000 fee represented an offer to "fix" Frazier's case. 4
Krantz and Van Howe, hoping to obtain conclusive evidence
of McCall's offer to "fix" Frazier's case, persuaded Frazier to
secretly tape record her next meeting with McCall. Krantz and
Van Howe's examination of the transcript of the recorded conversation revealed evidence of possible violations of legal ethics, 15
but, in their own words, "[t]he Times found no indication of any
'fix' "16

Despite its failure to uncover meaningful proof of Frazier's
charge that McCall had offered to "fix" her case,.the Times re-

9 Id. at 886. See notes 51-77 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the'
negligence
standard.
0
Id. at 887-88. See notes 89-135 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of
false light invasion of privacy.
11 The Louisville Times, Mar. 17, 1976, at Al, col. 5 (Home-Early Edition).
12 623 S.W.2d at 883.
13Id. at 884.
14 Id. at 883-84.
15 Id. at 884-85. The possible violations of legal ethics were that McCall proposed a
contingency fee in a criminal case, and that McCall suggested to Frazier that he could improperly influence a judge. Id. at 891 (Lukowsky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) & DR 9-101(C)
(1971).
16 The Louisville Times, Mar. 17, 1976, at Al, col. 5 (Home-Early Edition).
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ported the McCall investigation in a lengthy article, focusing
upon the ethical violations.17 McCall subsequently brought suit
against the Times, as well as reporters Krantz and Van Howe,
for libel and invasion of privacy. McCall's libel claim centered
upon one paragraph in the article which repeated Frazier's
charge of an offer to "fix": "The Times requested that Miss Frazier tape-record the conversation because the newspaper was attempting to investigate her allegations that McCall had offered
to 'fix' her case for $10,000. However, The Times found no indication of any 'fix."' 8
I.

LIBEL

Libel is the publication, in written form, 19 of a false and defamatory statement about another. 20 A statement is defamatory if
it tends to subject one to "hatred, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace, or tend[s] to induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of
right thinking people."2' 1 Kentucky courts have expressly held
that statements which charge an attorney with unprofessional
conduct are defamatory. 2 The McCall Court, determining that
the Times article suggested that McCall "solicit[ed] a high legal
fee for the purpose of fixing a case or bribing a judge," held the
article to be defamatory as a matter of law. 3 The Court then
17 Id.
18 Id.

19 Register Newspaper Co. v. Worten, III S.W. 693 (Ky. 1908). The advent of
radio, television and sound amplification devices, which enable spoken words to be disseminated to large numbers of people, has blurred the traditional distinction between libel
and slander: that slander is oral defamation while libel refers to written or printed defamation. See I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTs § 5.9 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER & JAMES]; 50 AM. Jun. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 4-5 (1970). "Libel consists
of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment
In physical form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful
qualities characteristic of written or printed words." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
568(1) (1977).
20 See 111 S.W. at 697; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 568, at 177 (1977).
2 Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1966). A
statement is defamatory if it tends to "harm the reputation or to deter such people from associating with the person" who is defamed. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 19, § 5.1, at
350.
2 E.g., Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1019 (1967); Baker v. Clark, 218 S.W. 280,283 (Ky. 1920).
2 623 S.W.2d at885.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 70

moved to a consideration of the principal issue in McCall-"the
impact of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United-States
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.... on the libel law of Ken2
tucky.Y
The constitutionalization of the law of defamation began in
1964 with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.25 In the New York
Times case, the Supreme Court held that public officials could
not recover damages for libel unless they could establish with
"convincing clarity" that the defendant had "actual malice"actual knowledge of the statement's falsity or conduct exhibiting
reckless disregard for its truthfulness.29 In Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 7 the Court extended the New York Times holding to
libelous statements about public figures.8 The constitutional
protection afforded publishers of libelous statements about public officials and public figures was further bolstered in St. Amant
v. Thompson,.2 which held that proof of the "reckless disregard
for truth or falsity" component of the "actual malice" standard
required a showing that the defendant "in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." 3° This series of
victories for the press and first amendment rights reached its
zenith in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,31 when a plurality of
the Court held that the criterion triggering application of the
New York Times rule was not whether the plaintiff was a public
official or public figure, but whether the allegedly libelous state2

4 Id. at 889 (Lukowsky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Gertz

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
25 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has not been neglected in
the law review literature. See, e.g., Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New
ConstitutionalPrivilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1 (1965); Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First
Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of
Libel: The Modern Revised Translation,49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964).
26 376 U.S. at 279-80.
. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
28 Id. at 155. In a subsequent decision, the Court defined a public figure as one who
assumes a role of "especial prominence in the affairs of society," usually by virtue of having "thrust" himself "to the forefront of particular public controversies." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345 (1974). See generallyWolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443
U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
2 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
30 Id. at 731.
31 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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ment involved an issue of "public or general concern." 2
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,3 the United States Supreme
Court retreated from the public interest test of Rosenbloom and
reinstated the public official/public figure test of the New York
Times case and the Curtis decision.-4 Gertz held that the New
York Times "actual malice" standard of liability is not constitutionally required in defamation actions by private individuals
and the Court assigned the task of establishing the requisite standard of liability to the states,rs subject to certain limitations. The
Court identified the following limitations: the states cannot "impose liability without fault;"' "the substance of the defamatory
statement [must make] 'substantial danger to reputation apparent;' " and, finally, recovery for the libel must be limited to "actual" injury, with punitive damages permissible only upon a
showing of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 8
Gertz represents the Supreme Court's delimitation of federal
constitutional preemption of state defamation law. Federal law
(the New York Times case and its progeny) controls only when
public officials or public figures are involved; state defamation
law controls, subject to the minimal constitutional limitations of
Gertz, when a private individual is defamed.-"

32

Id.at 52.

33 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

4
Id. at 346. The Court labeled "[t]he extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality... unacceptable." Id.
3 Id. at 347.
30
Id.
37
Id. at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 n.10).
- 8.Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 349.
39 There are a number of excellent law review articles on the Gertz decision. See,
e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX.L. REv. 422 (1975); Ashdown,
Gertz and Firestone: A Study in ConstitutionalPolicy-Making, 61 MINN. L. Rev. 645
(1976-77); Eaton, American Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An AnalyticalPrimer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Frakt, DefamationSince
Certz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 519
(1979); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REv. 199 (1976).
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Kentucky's Post-Gertz Standard of Liability: Simple Negligence

A person who repeats defamatory statements made by
another becomes a "republisher" of the defamation, and is inde40
pendently liable for the defamatory impact of the statement.
That the republisher accurately quotes and identifies the source
of the statement or accompanies the statement with the disclaimer that he does not believe the statement to be true is not a
defense to the republisher's liability. 4' The law disregards the republisher's actual intentions or motives and considers the repub42
lisher as having adopted the defamatory statement as his own
The libel claim in McCall was based upon republished liabilitythe Louisville Times' republication of Frazier's allegation that
McCall had offered to "fix" her case. The newspaper's disclaimer, "the Times found no indication of any 'fix,"' did not
constitute a defense to the libel action. 43
In an attempt to avoid the imposition of republisher liability,
the Louisville Times urged the'Court 44 to adopt the "neutral reportage" privilege, 45 which shields the media from republisher li40

See Gearhart v. WSAZ, 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Nicholson v. Rust, 52
S.W. 933, 934 (Ky. 1899); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 768
(4th ed. 1971); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). See Painter, Republication
Problems in the Law of Defamation, 47 VA. L. REV. 1131 (1961), for an excellent discussion of republisher liability.
41 See 52 S.W. 933; W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 113, at 768; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 578 comment e (1977).
42 See Evans v. Smith, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 363, 364 (1827) ("[o]ne who details slander, which he has heard from others endorsesit ....")(emphasis added).
43 623 S.W.2d at 890, 894 (Lukowsky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Truth" is, of course, a complete defense to an action for libel. Bell v. Courier-Journal &
Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d at 87. A republisher, however, cannot avail itself of the
defense of truth by establishing that it was true that the original publisher made the defamatory statement; the republisher must establish the truth of the underlying charge. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment e (1977). In McCall, the Louisville
Times would have had to establish the truthfulness of the charge that McCall offered to
"fix" Frazier's criminal case, not the truthfulness of the fact that Frazier made the accusation.
The longstanding rule that the defendant has the burden of establishing truth in a
libel action may have been abolished by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. See
notes 78-88 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of Gertz.
44 McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d at 886.
45 There exist two longstanding common law privileges to republisher liability: the
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ability when it accurately and disinterestedly republishes defamatory statements of fact which concern matters of significant
public interest. 46 The leading case is Edwards v. NationalAudubon Society, Inc. 47 In Edwards, the Second Circuit held privreporter's privilege and the privilege of fair comment. The reporters privilege protects the
fair and accurate republication of a defamatory statement, even if the reporter knows the
statement is false, when the republication is included in an account of official judicial, legislative or governmental proceedings which concern a matter of legitimate public interest.
See Greenfield v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 283 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1955);
Paducah Newspapers, Inc. v. Bratcher, 118 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. 1938); Begley v. Louisville
Times Co., 115 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1938); 1 HAEPR & JAMES, supra note 19, at § 5.24; W.
PROSSER, supra note 40, § 118, at 830-33; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977).
The reporters privilege in Kentucky is also secured by statute. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
411.060 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The reporter's privilege has been
elevated to a constitutional immunity in certain instances. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) ('[Tihe First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow
exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public
in official court records."); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6,
13 (1970) ("[clonstitutionally impermissible" to impose liability for accurate report of
what was said at public hearing before a city council).
The qualified privilege of fair comment protects statements of opinion regarding
matters of legitimate public concern, when the statements are based on true or privileged
statements of fact. Pulverman v. A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1956); Democrat
Publishing Co. v. Harvey, 205 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1918); 1 HAUIER & JAMES. supra note 19, at
§ 5.28. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, the Supreme Court, in effect,
bestowed constitutional status upon fair comment by creating a constitutional privilege to
defame public officials, absent a showing of "actual malice." The constitutional case for
fair comment was strengthened in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. when the Court stated:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas." 418 U.S. at 339-40. See Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). The American Law Institute has taken the position that the common law privilege of fair comment is now obsolete, insofar as mere expression of opinion is concerned. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A comment a

(1977). A mere expression of opinion should be distinguished, however, from an opinion
which "implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion."
Id. at§ 566.
46 The "neutral reportage" privilege encompasses only defamatory statements of
fact, as distinguished from statements of opinion protected as fair comment. See note 45
supra for a discussion of fair comment. In effect, "neutral reportage" represents an extension of the reporters privilege from reports of official proceedings to reports of all matters
of public interest. See note 45 supra for a discussion of the common law reporters privilege. See generally Sowle, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: The Casefor a ConstitutlonalPrivilegeof Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1979); Note, Protectingthe Publie Debate: A Proposed Constitutional Privilegeof Accurate Republication, 58 TEx. L.
REv. 623 (1980); Comment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 1266 (1977).
47 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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*ileged a republication by the New York Times of defamatory accusations made by a spokesman for the National Audubon Society. The court deemed the republication privileged because it
found the defamatory statements "newsworthy."' 4 The McCall
Court rejected the "neutral reportage" privilege in summary
fashion, 49 rendering the Louisville Times potentially liable to
McCall as a republisher of Frazier's defamatory allegation.
At common law the publisher (and the republisher) of a defamatory statement was strictly liable for the consequences of his
defamatory statements, regardless of innocent motives, good intentions or lack of fault.-5 Gertz, however, expunged strict liability from defamation law and forced the states to adopt faultbased liability standards for defamation. 51 The facts of McCallthe republication by a newspaper of defamatory remarks made
about a private individual- 2-forced the Kentucky Supreme
Court to confront Gertz's mandate to abrogate common law
strict liability and to "define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual."' The McCall Court
chose a simple negligence standard,5 stating:
We have given considerable thought to an appropriate standard, recognizing the far-reaching effects of this ruling on the
rights and duties of the press in this state. We are also aware of
48

Id. at 120. The Third Circuit rejected Edwards and the "neutral reportage" privilege in Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978). Accord Dixson v. Newsweek,
Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977).
49 623 S.W.2d at 887.
so See Ray v. Shemwell, 217 S.W. 351 (Ky. 1919); W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 113,
at 771. As one commentator noted:
The common law held that, except for the requirement of publication to a
third party (for which either intent or negligence had to be shown) a defendant is held strictly liable even for innocent defamations, even though the
resulting consequences were not intended and he was not negligent in
gathering the facts upon which the publication was based.
Spenceri Establishmentof Faultin Post-Gertz Libel Cases, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 374, 377
(1977.
51 See the text accompanying notes 33-39 supra for a discussion of the holding in
Gerit.
52
Both litigants in McCall conceded that McCall was a private individual, not a
public figure or public official, for purposes of applying Gertz. 623 S.W.2d at 885.
53 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 347.
54 The Kentucky Court of Appeals had previously chosen to apply a negligence stan-
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the fundamental right of private individuals to be free from
being defamed.
The Kentucky Constitution guarantees freedom of the
press, but holds newspapers accountable for abusing that liberty.
... Kentucky Const., See. 8, mandates that we adopt a
standard which adequately protects the private individual
from defamation. We choose simple negligence.s

In choosing a negligence standard of care,-s the Kentucky Supreme Court aligned itself with the majority among those states
that have expressly chosen a post-Gertz standard of liability. Of
the sixteen states that have chosen a standard, thirteen have
chosen simple negligence.57 Three states, deeming the press deserving of greater protection, have adopted more stringent tests.
Colorado5 and IndianaP9 have retained the pre-Gertz standard
dard of care in a libel case by a private individual against a newspaper. See E.W. Scripps
Co. v. Cholmondelay, 569 S.W.2d700,703 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
W623 S.W.2d at 886.
56 The negligence standard of care in libel cases by private individuals against the
news media has been widely discussed in the law reviews. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note
39; Ashdown, supra note 39; Phillips, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Constitutional Standard of Care, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 77 (1975); Robertson, supra note 39;
Spencer, supra note 50; Note, In Defense of Faultin DefamationLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1735
(1979); Comment, The DefamationAction for PrivateIndivlduals. The New FaultStandards,14 S.D.L. REv. 163 (1977).
57 See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216,1222 (Ariz. 1977); Cahill
v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356,1366 (Hawaii 1975); Troman v. Wood,
340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (IM.1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 531 P.2d 76, 84 (Kan.
1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 697 (Md. 1976); Stone v. Essex County
Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Mass. 1975); Thomas H. Maloney& Sons, Inc. v.
E.W. Scripps Co., 334 N.E. 2d 494,497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883
(1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 89 (Okla. 1976); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers,
Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 818 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v.
KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1981); Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d
81, 85 (Wash. 1976). The District of Columbia has also adopted a negligence standard.
See Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 45.A.2d 78, 87 (D.C. 1980). In addition tothe above jurisdictions, the American Law Institute has also adopted a negligence standard. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRS § 580B (1977).
58 Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457 (Colo. 1975) "[W]hen a
defamatory statement has been published concerning [a private individual], but the matter involved is of public or general concern, the publisher... will be liable... if, and
only if, he knew the statement to be false or made the statement with reckless disregard for
whether it was true or not.").
59
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
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set out in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,6° requiring that a
private individual prove knowing falsity or reckless disregard of
the truth when the defamatory publication is a matter of public
or general concern.61 New York has opted for a similar standard,
requiring a showing of the media's gross negligence when "the
content of the [allegedly defamatory] article is arguably within
2
the sphere of legitimate public concern." 6
Despite its overwhelming acceptance by the state courts, the
simple negligence standard of care is unsatisfactory because it
fails to provide a newspaper with any reliable guidelines to
which it can conform its conduct with relative assurance that it
has protected itself from a libel suit. Any action governed by a
negligence standard would ultimately hinge upon a jury's determination of reasonableness. It is highly unlikely that a newspaper could accurately predict whether some future jury would
consider its editorial decision to publish a defamatory statement
reasonable or unreasonable. Therefore, in order to protect itself,
the newspaper will at times decline to publish statements even
though a jury would have found a decision to publish reasonable. The negligence standard of care exacts too dear a price for
the protection of private citizens from reputational damage. Self-

N.E.2d 580, 586 (Ind.Ct. App. 1974) ("We adopt a standard that requires the private individual who brings a libel action involving an event of general or public interest to prove
that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false.").
60 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
61 Id. at 52. See the text accompanying notes 31-32 supra for a statement of the holding in Rosenbloom.
62 Chapadeauv. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. 1975).
63 See Ashdown, supra note 39, at 673; Robertson, supra note 39, at 251. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Justice Brennan discussed the inadequacy of utilizing a negligence
standard:
[Ihe vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us
that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a
jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care
would not provide adequate "breathing space" for these great freedoms.
Reasonable care is an "elusive standard" that "would place on the press the
intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of
steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture
or portrait." Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship
and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be deterred.
403 U.S. at 50 (quoting Time;, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)) (citation omitted).
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censorship 64 of statements concerning matters of public interest
which may, in fact, be true is so high a price to pay when the
newspaper, operating under daily deadlines and unsure of the
statements' truthfulness at the time, fears the consequences of a
potential libel judgment and decides not to publish the statements.
Although negligence is a creature of the common law and a
familiar concept to all state courts, this familiarity has not necessarily resulted in a smooth transfer of negligence concepts from
physical torts to defamation.6 The McCall Court's two attempts
to formulate an appropriate negligence standard of care exemplify this difficulty. First, the Court adopted Tennessee's formulation of the negligence standard of .care for defamation actions
concerning private individuals: "The appropriate question to be
determined from a preponderance of the evidence is whether the
defendant exercised reasonable care and caution in checking on
the truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication before publishing it." 6 The Court then enunciated a
second standard, supposedly the equivalent of the first: "Another
way of stating the standard is that a private plaintiff may recover
on a showing of simple negligence, measured by what a reasonably prudent person would or would not have done under the
same or similar circumstances." 67
Inspection reveals the two "equivalent" standards to be
neither satisfactory nor synonymous. The first standard is too
narrow in its scope, focusing only upon the reasonableness of the
newspaper's investigation of the defamatory publication. Arguably, in McCall, the Louisville Times exercised due care in
"checking on" the truthfulness or untruthfulness of Frazier's allegations. The critical inquiry should be whether the Times, once

I Self-censorship, in this context, occurs "whenever a reporter or editor omits a
word, a passage, or an entire story, not for journalistic reasons but because of the possible
legal implications." Anderson, supra note 39, at 430-31.
65 "Much of that vocabulary [of negligence law as applied to the physical torts] is inappropriate, confusing, or incomprehensible when applied to communications torts." Id.
at 480.
66 623 S.W.2d at 886 (quoting Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412,
418 (1978)).
67 623 S.W.2d at 886.
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its investigation raised doubts as to the truthfulness of those allegations, was acting reasonably when it republished the allegations despite those doubts. 68
One could find some reason to doubt the truthfulness of almost any statement; the issue should not be whether some doubt
exists, but whether an unreasonabledegree of doubt exists. In St.
Amant v. Thompson,69 the United States Supreme Court held
that "actual malice" liability required a showing that the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truthfulness of the defamatory statement. v0 Negligence liability, in comparison,
should require a lesser
degree of doubt, perhaps a showing of
"significant" doubt. 71 Proper determination of the Louisville
Times' negligence in McCall requires an inquiry into whether the
Times doubted or should have had significant doubts about the
truthfulness of Frazier's allegations when it republished those allegations. The first standard espoused by the McCall Court ignores this critical aspect of the due care issue.
The second McCall standard, 72 unlike the first, is broad
enough in scope to inquire into the reasonableness of both the investigation and the publication of the allegedly defamatory statement. The problem with the second standard is that its generalized reasonableness requirement allows the jury to base its determination of liability upon immaterial factors such as the newspaper's accurate republication, the fairness or disinterestedness
of the newspaper's report, and the newsworthiness of the defam8 After all, it is the republication of the defamation, not the investigation, which
causes the injury.
Kentucky and Tennessee are not the only jurisdictions to formulate post-Gertz
negligence standards of care which place sole emphasis upon the reasonableness of the
newspaper's investigation of the defamatory matter. See, e.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d at 1222 (Ariz.); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d at 974 (Utah);
Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d at 85 (Wash.).
69 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
70
Id. at 731. See the text accompafiying notes 29-30 supra for a discussion of St.
Amant v. Thompson.
71 The term "significant doubt" has been substituted for the term "unreasonable
doubt" for the purpose of distinguishing it from the criminal law concept of "reasonable
doubt." Seethe text accompanying note 77 infra for a definition of "significant doubt."
72 The standard mandates conduct equivalent to "what a reasonably prudent person
would or would not have done under the same or similar circumstances." 623 S.W.2d at
886.
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atory statement. When the McCall Court rejected the "neutral
reportage" privilege, 73 its message was clear: neither the accuracy of the newspaper's republication, nor the fairness and disinterestedness of the newspaper report, nor the newsworthiness of
the defamatory statement, can justify a libelous republication. 74
The second McCall standard, because it contains no language
which might serve to prevent the jury from considering these immaterial factors, gives the jury an opportunity to resurrect the
"neutral reportage" privilege in its determination of the defendant's negligence liability. 7
Both McCall standards are deficient. The first standard is too
narrow in scope; it considers only the newspaper's investigation
of the defamatory allegation, and ignores a more important factor-the defendant's doubts as to the truthfulness of the defamatory statement at the time of republication.76 The second
McCall standard is too broad; it permits the jury to base its determination of negligence liability on immaterial factors.
An adequate standard of care should focus the jury's attention on the defendant's degree of doubt and, at the same time,
prevent the jury from considering immaterial factors such as the
newsworthiness of the defamatory statement or the fairness and
accuracy of the republication. Based on these guidelines, an adequate post-Gertz negligence standard of care can be formulated
as follows:
Considering all the circumstances, at the time of publication did the defendant have, or in the exercise of due care,
should he have had, (at a minimum) significant doubts as to
the truthfulness of the defamatory publication; if so, you must
find for the plaintiff. "Significant doubt" exists when a reason73 Id. at 887.
74 See notes 45-49 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the "neutral

reportage" privilege and the Kentucky Supreme Court's treatment of it.
75 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Supreme Court stated: "Nothing in the Constitution requires that assessment of fault in a civil case tried in a state court
be made by a jury, nor is there any prohibition against such a finding being made in the
first instance by an appellate, rather than a trial, court." Id. at 461. Although they may
not be constitutionally bound to do so, it is almost certain that the states will continue the
common law practice of letting the jury decide issues of negligence.
76 See notes 68-71 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the first
McCall standard.
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able person, in the same or similar circumstances, would consider his belief as to the truthfulness of a defanatory statement
to be outweighed by his doubts as to the statement's truthfulness and the severity of the resulting ieputational harm. A significant doubt is less than serious doubt.77
Central to the determination of whether a defendant's
doubts were "significant" is the severity of the resulting reputational damage; the same degree of uncertainty or doubt may be
significant or insignificant depending upon the seriousness of the
defamatory allegation. For example, assume that in McCall Frazier had alleged, in addition to her allegation that McCall had offered to "fix" her criminal case, that McCall had also offered to
"fix" a parking ticket she had received. Assume too, that the
Louisville Times' investigation of Frazier's allegations raised the
same doubts as to each charge: Frazier and her friend were of
questionable veracity; the tape recording of Frazier's second
meeting with McCall revealed no corroborative evidenc6; and
McCall vehemently denied both charges. In this case, the quantum of doubt as to the truthfulness of each allegation would be
identical, but the seriousness of the charge to offer to "fix" a
criminal case could render that doubt significant, while the relatively trivial allegation of an offer to "fix" a parking ticket could
cause that doubt to be deemed insignificant or slight.
B.

The Impact of Gertz on Other Areas of Kentucky Defama78
tion Law

After adopting simple negligence as the appropriate standard, and enunciating two negligence standards of care, the
McCall Court made a curious statement: "The adoption of this

77 Two states have formulated post-Gertz negligence standards of care similar to this
author's proposal. See Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d at 299 (111. 1975) ("[R]eeovery may
be had upon proof that the publication was false, and that the defendant either knew it to
be false, or, believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for that belief."); Gobin v.
Globe Publishing Co., 531 P.2d at 84 (Kan. 1975) ('[A] publisher or broadcaster ... is liable ... when the assertion of the falsehood is the result of the publisher's or broadcasters negigence and when the substance of the assertion makes substantial danger to
reputation apparent .... ").
78
Whether Gertz applies only to libel suits brought against media defendants or to
all libel actions, even when brought against private individuals, is uncertain at the present
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standard does not imply any change in the basic common law
and statutory rules of libel and slander as expressed and interpreted by this court in the past. See Wilson v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co. ..

-79 What is curious about the statement is

the Court's citation to Wilson v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting
Co. ;o if the Court adopted the holding of Wilson, Kentucky's
"basic common law and statutory rules of libel and slander"
would be changed.
In Kentucky defamation law, it is well established both by
case law," and by statute82 that the defendant has the burden of
proving the truth of the defamatory statement as an affirmative
defense. In Wilson, however, the Sixth Circuit held that "[a]s a
matter of federal First Amendment law, the burden must be
placed on the plaintiff to show falsity." ' The court in Wilson
based its reversal of the well-settled burden of proving truth
upon two aspects of Gertz. First, as a practical matter, it would
be "impossible" for a plaintiff to prove a newspaper negligent
without first establishing the alleged defamatory statement to be
false. Proof of falsity, the Wilson court stated, is "inevitably
linked" to the plaintiffs post-Gertz proof of negligence. Secondly, the court reasoned that the common law placement of the
burden of proving truth upon the defendant operated, in effect,
as a presumption of falsity; such a presumption, in a close case,
would operate to impermissibly impose "liability without

time. Compare Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980) and
Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359 (Or. 1977) and Fleming v.
Moore, 275 S.E.2d 632 (Va. 1981) (all holding that Gertz does not apply to non-media defendants) with Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (holding that Gertz applies to
media and non-media defendants alike). See generally Note, FirstAmendment Protecion
Against Libel Actions: DistinguishingMedia and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L.
R1v. 902
(1974).
79
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d at 886 (citing
Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981))..
80 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
81 Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d at 87; Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
82 KRS § 411.045 (1972) states in part: "In actions of libel or slander, the defendant
may state the truth of the alleged libel or slander ...
83 642 F.2d at 376.
84 Id. at 375.
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fault."' The reasoning in Wilson, which is in accord with both
the Restatement (Second) of Torts" and the holdings of other
courts, 87 is sound and should be adopted in Kentucky. After
Gertz, the defamed plaintiff must establish that the defendant
was at least negligent in publishing the particular defamation; it
is difficult to conceive, however, just how the plaintiff can establish that it was unreasonable for the defendant to publish the defamatory statement unless the statement is first proven to be
false.
Instead of supporting the McCall Court's statement that
Kentucky defamation law remains basically unchanged by
Gertz, Wilson directly contradicts it. Until the Kentucky Supreme Court clarifies its ambiguous citations to Wilson, it will
remain unclear, in defamation suits brought by private individuals against the media, whether the plaintiff has the burden of
proving the falsity of the allegedly defamatory publication or
whether the defendant has the burden of proving its truthfulness
as an affirmative defense.
II.

FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY

In part II of McCall, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered McCall's invasion of privacy claims."0 McCal's complaint
had alleged that Krantz and Van Howe had invaded his privacy
by sending Frazier into his office with a concealed tape recorder.0 McCal's amended complaint alleged that the Louisville
Times article had placed McCall "in a false light before the members of the general public.""' Only the false light claim was con2
sidered by the Court in McCall.1
85

Id.

86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment j (1977).

87 See Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d at 299; Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d at
698.
88 According to A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION rule 2.2(a) (13th ed. 1981), the signal "see" indicates that the "[clited authority directly supports the proposition." Certainly
Wilson does not directly support the McCall Court's statement that Kentucky's defamation law remains otherwise unchanged by the adoption of a negligence standard.
89
623 S.W.2d at 887.
90
Id.
91
9 2 Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. The McCall Court's decision to decide the privacy claims only on the basis of
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The FalseLight Cause of Action

The tort of invasion of privacy has been defined as not one
tort, but a complex of four distinct torts, each addressing in some
way an interference with the "right to be let alone." 93 The four
distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy are: (1) intrusion

upon the seclusion of another; (2) unauthorized appropriation of
the name or likeness of another; (3) public disclosure of private
facts about another; and (4) placing another before the public in
a false light. 4Kentucky has recognized the tort of invasion of privacy for most of this century. 95 During this time, Kentucky courts
have recognized valid causes of action for: intrusion upon seclu-

false light is indeed interesting. The false light issue was neither argued nor briefed before
either the court of appeals or the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id. at 889 (Lukowsky, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The late Justice Lukowsky dissented form part H of
the McCall opinion, stating: "[The majority's] fervor to decide an abstract question of law
without the framework of a concrete case and the advantage of briefing and argument escapes me." Id.
The Court did not rule on McCall's claim that his right of privacy was invaded
when the Louisville Times reporters sent Frazier into his office with a concealed tape recorder. That claim was based upon Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.
1971). In Dietemann, the media defendants, investigating charges of medical quackery,
gained admission to the plaintiff doctor's office on a ruse, and proceeded secretly to photograph the doctor and tape record his conversations. The Dietemann court found the defendant liable for wrongful intrusion upon seclusion, stating:
One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor
may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and
observes when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to take
the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or in our modem world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at
large or any segment of it that the visitor may select.
Id. at 249.
Under present Kentucky law, it seems clear that it is not an invasion of privacy for
one party secretly to tape record a conversation with another. See Commonwealth v.
Brinkley, 326 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1962). See also KRS § 526.010 (1975) (exempting an eavesdropper from criminal liability when one of the conversants has consented to the eavesdropping). Because the McCall Court did not decide the issue, it remains to be seen whether Kentucky will follow Dietemann and refuse to exempt secret tape recordings of
another's conversation from privacy claims when a media defendant is involved.
93 W. PRossER, supranote 40, § 117, at 804.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Wheeler v. P. Sorenson Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967); Bell v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84; Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d
214 (Ky. 1959); Lucas v. Moskins Stores, 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1953); Perry v. Moskins
Stores, 249 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1952); Pangallo v. Murphy, 243 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1951);
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sion; 96 appropriation of another's name or likeness;97 and public
disclosure of private facts."8
Until McCall, however, rio Kentucky court had ever granted
a privacy cause of action in a case involving an allegedly false
statement. In McCall, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the
tort of false light invasion of privacy 99 which is enunciated in section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.1 0

The false light cause of action is relatively simple;'10 however,
uncertainty as to the proper constitutional restrictions upon false
light complicates an otherwise simple equation. In a pre-Gertz
decision, Time, Inc. v. Hill,1°2 the United States Supreme Court
extended the constitutional privilege enunciated by the New

Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951); Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 174 S.W.2d
510 (Ky. 1943); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1941); Rhodes v.
Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1929);
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967; Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912); Foster-Milbum Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909). See generally Bunch, Kentucky's Invasionof
Privacy Tort-A Reappraisal,56 Ky. L.J. 261 (1967-68); Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A
Contra View), 19 Ky. L.J. 137 (1930-31); Moreland, The Right of Privacy To-day, 19 Ky.
L.J. 101 (1930-31); Ragland, The Right of Privacy, 17 Ky. L.J. 85 (1928-29); Comment,
Torts-Rightof Privacyin Kentucky, 38 Ky. L.J. 487 (1949-50).
96 Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46.
97 Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849; Foster-Milburn v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364.
98 Lucas v. Moskins Stores, 262 S.W.2d 679; Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588;
Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708; Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967.
99
100623 S.W.2d at 887-88.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).

10' The defenses to a claim of false light invasion of privacy include the truth of the
matter asserted as well as the absolute and qualified privileges of defamation law. See
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALF. L. REv. 383, 419-21 (1960).
The false light plaintiff may recover damages for the harm to the plaintiffs privacy interest, reasonable mental distress and special damages. REATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §
652H (1977).

102 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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York Times case to media defendants in false light privacy actions. In Hill, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not
"redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence
of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge
of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth."'103 In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 1° however, the Supreme Court characterized the public interest/public concern test for determining the
application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as "unacceptable." 10 Because Gertz was a defamation action, and not a privacy action, its impact upon Hill is uncertain; at the least, Gertz
raises substantial doubt as to the current validity of Time, Inc. v.
Hill.10 The McCall Court acknowledged the uncertainty of this
issue, stating that if Gertz did apply, a simple negligence standard would govern; but, lacking any express indication by the
United States Supreme Court that Gertz modified or overruled
Time, Inc. v. Hill,1°0 the Kentucky Court chose to abide by the
"actual malice" standard of the latter.10 As long as a private individual must prove knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth in order to recover for false light invasion of privacy, the
newly adopted cause of action will be of little practical significance to Kentucky plaintiffs.

('3 Id. at 388.
104 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See notes 33-39 supra and the accompanying text for a dis-

cussion of Gertz.
105 418 U.S. at 346.
106 After Gertz, the continued vitality of the Hi!! decision is in substantial
doubt. There seems to be no justification for holding the false-light victim to a higher burden of proof than his private counterpart in a defamation action. The only conceivable basis for doing so is to assume
either that the false-light victim's interest in his privacy is less weighty
than the defamation victim's interest in his reputation, or that the defendant in a false-light case has a correspondingly greater interest in
publishing than a defamation defendant does. Neither seems persuasive as a general proposition.
Phillips, supranote 56, at 99. See also Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977)
(district court holding that Gertz did overrule Time, Inc. v. Hill).
107 In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), a false light invasion of privacy action, the Supreme Court declined to address the impact of Gertz upon
Time, Inc. v. Hill. Id. at 250-51.
108 McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d at 889.
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False Light and Defamation

Both the validity and the necessity of the tort of false light invasion of privacy have been questioned since the tort was first described by Dean Prosser in a 1960 law review article.1 9 The longstanding criticism of false light centers on its similarity to the law
of defamation, and its dissimilarity to the law of privacy. 10 False
light does not protect a privacy interest;"' it protects a reputational one,"2 as does defamation." 3 As one commentator questioned: "Is it an invasion of privacy to say falsely of a man that he
is a thief?"" 4

109 See Prosser, supra note 101. Prosser stated:

The question may well be raised, and apparently still is unanswered, whether this branch of the tort is not capable of swallowing up and engulfing the
whole law of public defamation .... If that turns out to be the case, it

may well be asked, what of the numerous restrictions and limitations which
have hedged defamation about for many years, in the interest of freedom of
the press and in the discouragement of trivial and extortionate claims? Are
they of so little consequence that they may be circumvented in so casual and
cavalier a fashion?
Id. at 401. See generally Bloustein, Privacyas an Aspect of Human Dignity:An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the
FirstAmendment, 76 COLuM. L. REv. 1205 (1976); Kalven, Privacyin Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis WrongP, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROs. 326 (1966); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND.L. REv. 1093 (1962); Note, FalseLight: Invasion
of PrivacyP, 15 TULSA L.J. 113 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, FalseLight]; Note, Privacy in the FirstAmendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973).
110 See Bloustein, supra note 109; Kalven, supra note 109; Prosser, supra note 101;
Wade, supranote 109; Note, FalseLight, supra note 109.
III The law of privacy protects the right of a person to live free from unnecessary and
unreasonable inspections of his personal affairs; privacy protects an interest in mental
tranquility. See Wade, supranote 109, at 1094; Note, FalseLight, supra note 109, at 11819.
112 Prosser, supranote 101, at 400, 422.
113
W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 111, at 737.
114 Kalven, supranote 109, at 340. Another commentator suggested:
There is a logical inconsistency between requiring on the one hand that
a matter be private and, on the other, that it be false.
...This illogic arises from the fact that the person referred to in the
statement cannot intend to keep private a matter which, in her own mind,
does not exist. If the statement is false, then the person about whom it is
made would have no reason to be aware of the subject matter. It must be
questioned, therefore, how that individual can desire to keep the subject
matter of the publication a private matter.
Note, FalseLight, supranote 109, at 125-26.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that in a case
where both a false light and a defamation cause of action may be
brought, the plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid any applicable limitations to recovery under defamation law by resort to
the false light cause of action. 1sThe Restatement's suggestion is
sound: the false light cause of action should only be applied to
areas of reputational harm to which defamation law has inadequately responded. Examples of such areas of reputational
harm include the following: "publicly falsely attributing to the
plaintiff some opinion or utterance;"11 6 "the use of the plaintiff's
picture to illustrate a book or an article with which he has had no
reasonable connection;" 17 and "the use of the plaintiffs name,
photograph and fingerprints in a public 'rogues' gallery of convicted criminals, when he has not in fact been convicted of any
crime." 8 In areas of reputational damage where defamation law
has traditionally provided an adequate remedy, as in McCall,
the false light action should not be applied.
The critics' concerns notwithstanding, the Kentucky Supreme Court in McCall legally adopted false light into the family
of Kentucky tort law. In a comparison between defamation and
false light many similarities appear, while the differences are
only of degree. Both protect the interest in reputation," 9 and
both require falsity. 120 An actionable false light statement, however, need not be defamatory' 21-tending to "subject [one] to
hatred, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace."'1 It must only be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."ss False light has a greater
publication requirement than defamation: to be actionable in

5
11
See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment e (1977).

116 Prosser, supra note 101, at 399.
117 Id. at 398-99.
118Id,

119
See W. PROSSER. supranote 40, § 111, at 737.
See Note, FalseLight, supra note 109, at 131.
PROSSER, supranote 40, § 117, at 813.
1
2 Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d at 86. See note 21
suprafor further discussion of what constitutes a defamatory statement.
123 A statement is "highly offensive to a reasonable person" when "the defendant
knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable man, would be justified in the eyes of the community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the publicity." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 652E comment c (1977).
120

121 W.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70

false light the publication must extend to the general public, 24
but defamation's publication requirement is satisfied by publication to only one person other than the plaintiff. 12 These differences between false light and defamation balance neatly; false
light requires a lesser degree of offensiveness than defamation,
while defamation has a lesser publication requirement than false
light.
Any statement objectionable enough to be defamatory will
be, a priori, highly offensive to a reasonable person and actionable in false light. Therefore the only element of a false light
cause of action which a plaintiff able to bring a defamation action must be concerned with is false light's greater publication requirement. If "publicity" is present, and arguably it will always
be present when a media defendant is involved, then nothing
prevents the plaintiff with a defamation action from also bringing a false light action.
There are at least two possible advantages to bringing a false
light action rather than a defamation action, only one of which is
available under present Kentucky law. The first possible advantage for the false light plaintiff is the avoidance of the statute of
limitations for defamation actions. In a state where the specific
defamation statute of limitations is shorter than that sfate's general tort statute of limitations, a time-barred defamation action
may nevertheless be timely if brought as a false light claim.1w
This advantage is unavailable in Kentucky, however, because
both its libel and slander statute of limitations and its general tort
statute of limitations are one year in length. 27
The second possible advantage to bringing an action for false
1
light is the inapplicability of defamation retraction statutes. 2w
Section 411.051 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) prevents
a plaintiff in a libel action against a newspaper from recovering
punitive damages if the defendant newspaper makes a "conspi124 Note, FalseLight, supra note 109, at 132.

1-HARPER &JAMES, supra note 19, § 5.15, at 390.
See, e.g., Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850.
Compare KES § 413.140(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980) with KES § 413.140(1)(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
12 See Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (court
considering whether defamation retraction statutes should be applied to privacy actions).
125
126
127
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cuous and timely publication of a correction after receiving a sufficient demand for correction."' 29 This limitation on recovery
would not apply to a false light claim. An even more restrictive
retraction statute, KRS section 411.061,"'3 limits a defamed
plaintiff's recovery in defamation from a radio or television station to only special damages, provided the requisite retraction is
made. The avoidance of this "specials-only" restriction should
make false light a very attractive alternative action for plaintiffs
defamed by radio or television stations.
Thus the benefits of bringing a false light action instead of, or
in addition to, a defamation action are inviting: a lesser showing
of offensiveness is required,'13 and restrictive retraction statutes
can be avoided.1 2 Yet, the benefits notwithstanding, the false
light tort has one overriding disadvantage: as formulated by the
McCall Court, the requisite standard of fault that the plaintiff
must establish is "actual malice"-knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Therefore, unless and until the Kentucky
Supreme Court holds that Time, Inc. v. Hill'" is overruled or
modified by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,""enabling false light
plaintiffs to recover on a showing of negligence, this newly
adopted member of the Kentucky tort family will be "treated like
a stepchild" by most Kentucky plaintiffs.

129

KRS § 411.051 (1972).

13" KIS § 411.061 (1972).

131 See notes 121-23 supra and the accompanying text for a comparison of the degree
of offensiveness required for defamation as opposed to that required for false light.
132 See notes 128-30 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of retraction
statutes applicable to defamation actions.
133McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co, 623 S.W.2d at 885. See notes
102-08 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the "actual malice" standard.
134 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
1- 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

